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Abstract 
   In this paper, we argue that democracies positively affect government expenditure. 
We hypothesize that democracies produce more public goods for their citizens 
because they are better at using tax revenues, while autocracies misappropriate taxes. 
We empirically test the validity of this argument using data on 61 countries from 1993 
to 2012. The explanatory variable used is a dichotomous measure of democracy, but 
we alter our analysis from earlier research by assuming that democracy is not an 
exogenous variable based on the theory of Huntington (1991)  and the methodology 
of Acemoglu, Naidu, Restpero and Robinson (2014) and Balamatsias (2017a) about 
regional democratization waves. According to this theory, democratization occurs in 
regional waves; consequently, diffusion of demand for or discontent with a political 
system is easier to happen in countries in the same area due to socio-political and 
historical similarities. This measure shows us that demand for or discontent with a 
political system in a geographical area influences the power of a country’s political 
regime and its effect on government policies. Our results using a number of 
estimations and robustness tests show us that regional democratization waves 
positively correlate with democracy. Furthermore, our main 2SLS regression as well 
as our OLS, fixed effects and GMM estimations show us that democracy increases 
production of public goods and services and education spending. When controlling for 
a smaller dataset, without African and Middle-eastern countries our first-stage results 
remain the same and the positive effect of democracy on government spending is now 
quantitatively bigger suggesting wealthier democracies produce more public goods 
and services when compared to poorer ones. This hypothesis is further substantiated 
when we use a sample consisting of non-OECD countries and find that democracy has 
no effect on government spending. Our results show that democracies where large 
segments of the population belong in the middle-income class, vote in favour of these 
policies because they can utilize government spending to increase production and 
output, lower inequality and attract foreign capital, unlike poorer democracies. 
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1. Introduction 
 
   Fiscal policy and more specifically government spending is a major issue in 
economics and politics. Research on the design and implementation of government 
spending programmes is at the forefront of economic policy analysis and is also one 
of the most debated subjects in the political arena. A number of studies on this subject 
have shown that the political system in every country plays an important role in the 
size, scope and composition of spending programmes. More specifically fiscal policy 
choices in democracies are made by the median voter and as a result, government 
spending in democracies is much greater when compared to autocracies because 
voters demand increased expenditures which produce public goods and redistribute 
incomes (Meltzer and Richards (1981,1983), Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b)). In 
non-democratic countries, powerful economic and political groups influence public 
policy choices. In such systems, governing elites choose to spend less on producing 
public goods and on redistribution because they stand to gain less from such policies 
and instead reallocate funds to increase their economic and political power as well as 
that of their political friends and allies (Hausken, Martin and Plumper (2004)). 
   In addition to the role that political systems play in spending policies, some authors 
have also studied how government expenditures affect political regimes and have 
found that the composition and size of spending programs can have an effect on the 
political regime. More specifically in autocracies, increased government spending 
targeted at specific parts of the population increases discontent leading to revolts 
which install a democracy which provides increased government spending in favour 
of the majority of the population(Wintrobe (2001)). In addition, concessions made by 
the ruling élite, in the form of increased government spending, can lead to 
democratization because the poor may view these concessions as a sign of weakness; 
consequently the lower classes revolt and establish a democratic regime which further 
increases expenditures in favour of the majority (Acemoglu and Robinson (2000a)).  
   These two different ways of analyzing the relationship between government 
spending and political regimes actually suggest that there exists a two-way causal 
relationship between democracy and government spending where one variable 
influences the other and is in turn influenced by it; to the best of our knowledge, this 
possible two-way causality between democracy and government spending has not 
been the research subject of any other author in the past as well. It is this gap in the 
literature that we try to cover with this paper; more specifically we will alter our 
analysis from that of other authors by analyzing this possible two-way causality and 
trying to find how it influences spending policies. 
    In addition to examining the two-way causal relationship between democracy and 
government spending, this paper will also be contributing to existing theories about 
the determinants of democracy in a country. In the past authors (Helliwell (1994), 
Rodrik (1999), Persson and Tabellini (2006), Aidt and Jensen (2009), Mutascu(2011)) 
have always treated a country’s political system as an exogenous variable, affected by 
political and economic conditions within a country, or only influenced by the regime 
of neighbouring countries, (Persson and Tabellini (2009)). But we will alter our 
estimation strategy from that of earlier authors by using the methodology of regional 
waves of democratization seen in Acemoglu, Naidu, Restpero and Robinson (2014) 
and Balamatsias (2017a) based on the theory of Huntington (1991). This approach is 
different from earlier ones because we do not treat democracy as an exogenous index 
or as a variable affected only by democracy in neighbouring countries; instead, we 
examine how the political system of countries in the same geographical area creates 
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regional waves of demand for or of discontent with a political system. We then use 
these regional democratization waves to explain how they affect democracy and 
consequently government spending in a country, using a 2SLS model. 
   Initially, we focus on the relevant literature and explore how government spending 
impacts on democratization; in addition, we also study the effect of democracy on 
spending policies. Furthermore, we briefly look at some of the most common 
determinants of government spending and how they interact with the political regime 
to shape the level and composition of government spending.    
   In our econometric analysis, we look at the equation and the variables we use to find 
the impact that the political regime has on government spending. As our dependent 
variable, we use a dichotomous measure of democracy; but we alter our analysis from 
that of earlier authors by assuming that the political regime is not an exogenous 
variable. Instead, we assume that the political regime of countries in the same area 
impact on a country’s own regime by creating regional waves of democratization or 
repression in a geographical area, as in Huntington (1991), Acemoglu, Naidu, 
Restpero and Robinson (2014) and Balamatsias (2017a). These regional waves show 
us the demand for or discontent with a given political system in a geographical area, 
which in turn influence the power of a country’s political regime and subsequently 
impact on government spending. In order to capture the endogeneity that regional 
political systems have on a country’s own political system and consequently on 
government spending, we use a two-stage least square (2SLS) fixed effects estimation 
with data from 61 countries from 1993 to 2012, similar to the methodology of 
Acemoglu, Naidu, Restpero and Robinson (2014) and Balamatsias (2017a). As an 
endogenous variable we used a country’s democracy index, which is a single 
dichotomous variable constructed using data on civil and political liberties from 
Polity IV and Freedom House; the instrumental variable we use is the jack-knifed 
average of the democracy index of all countries in the same geographical area, which 
captures the effect that regional democratization waves have on a country’s political 
regime.           
   Our results using a number of estimations and robustness tests show us that regional 
waves of democratization have a positive and statistically significant correlation with 
democracy. Furthermore, our main 2SLS estimation as well as our OLS, fixed effects 
and GMM estimations show us that democracy has a positive effect on government 
spending used for producing public goods and general public services and 
government spending on education. When controlling for a  smaller dataset, which 
does not include African and Middle-eastern countries our first-stage results remain 
the same while the positive effect of democracy on government spending is now 
quantitatively much bigger suggesting wealthier democracies produce more public 
goods and services when compared to poorer ones. This hypothesis is further 
substantiated when we use a smaller sample consisting of non-OECD countries and 
find no statistically significant effect of democracy on government spending. These 
results seem to suggest that democracy increases government expenditure mostly on 
developed countries because they can use increased government spending more 
effectively in order to increase productivity and output, decrease inequality (Meltzer 
and Richards (1981, 1983), Boix (2001)) and attract foreign capital (Schulze and 
Ursprung (1999)) therefore most voters in these countries are in favour of such 
policies.        
   The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we present the literature 
related to our subject. In section 3 we present a simple theoretical model which helps 
us present our main idea, section 3 has an analysis on the data that we use descriptive 
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statistics on our variables and a detailed method of construction of our regional 
democratization index and of the equations we use. In section 5 we present our 
regression results and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
   According to many authors, government spending has an impact on 
democratization. For example, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000a) use a political 
economy model of an autocracy were social unrest due to economic inequality can 
lead to the toppling of politico-economic elites and pave the way for the consolidation 
of democracy. In this model the authors argue that concessions by the ruling elite, in 
the form of increased voting rights and increased government spending, can, in fact, 
lead to full-scale democratization because the poor can view these concessions as a 
sign of weakness; consequently the lower classes choose to revolt since they perceive 
the government as weak and establish a democratic regime. Furthermore, Wintrobe 
(2001) reviews the behaviours of dictatorships and tries to propose and develop 
policies towards them. When examining the spending policies which autocracies 
follow the author argues that they tend to redistribute more but only to specific socio-
economic groups which support them and this selective use of government spending 
increases the cost and the difficulty of repressing the rest of the population. As a 
result, in the case of many autocratic regimes increased but selective government 
spending can lead to increased discontent for an autocracy and cause the people to 
revolt and install a democracy which then provides increased redistribution for more 
people.     
   Some authors have also argued that democracy leads to increased public goods 
production and increased redistribution. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b) argue that 
the redistributive programs which occurred in Western Europe during the 19th and 
20th centuries were the result of democratization and examine this hypothesis using a 
model in which autocracies choose if they will extend the voting franchise or not. In 
case they do, government spending rises since the median voter is now much pooper 
and demands greater redistribution. After the elite’s decision, the poor decide if they 
will revolt or not. If they revolt, the poor always succeed, seize the elite’s wealth and 
capital and use it in economic and home production, receiving all incomes. The 
authors conclude that autocracies prefer to democratize in order to avoid the loss of 
capital and wealth, which results in increased government spending. Hausken, Martin 
and Plumper (2004) develop a theoretical model where governments choose between 
providing rents or pure public goods in order to remain in power. The authors argue 
that when the level of democracy remains low then rents are preferred to the provision 
of public goods. However, as democratic participation increases, rents become 
increasingly costly as a source of political support and governments resort to 
increasing public goods production and provision instead. The authors empirically test 
the validity of their theoretical result and conclude that robust democratic regimes 
tend to increase the quantity of public goods they produce and offer to their citizens.  
   When examining the effect of the political regime on different types of spending, 
the literature suggests that democracies increase redistribution and public goods 
production to decrease inequality. Meltzer and Richards (1981, 1983) examine the 
way majority rule voting and redistributive needs affect fiscal policy using a general 
equilibrium model with income differences. Their results show that democracies 
increase taxes and redistribution in order to lower inequality and increase per capita 
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incomes.  Additionally, increased democratization, population growth and increases in 
inequality and incomes also raise taxes and spending. Boix (2001) examines how 
democracy and economic growth impact on fiscal policy. His results lead to two 
conclusions. First, as the economy grows and per capita income increases, production 
of public goods and capital rises to increase productivity, output and income and 
reduce inequality. However, since taxes are decided by the median voter a necessary 
condition for increasing government spending is a democratic political system where 
the majority of the population belongs to the middle-income class because only they 
benefit from increased government spending and are in favour of it; neither very poor 
nor very wealthy people benefit from government spending. Therefore, only relatively 
wealthy democracies increase government spending. On the other hand, some authors 
argue that inequality increases government spending regardless of the political regime 
by magnifying government spending multipliers. Auclert and Rognlie (2016) use an 
NK, DSGE model where skill differences and labour demand shortfalls limit labour 
supply and income, leading to inequality and different MPC. In this model, inequality 
lowers output because the negative covariance between income and the MPC is too 
small to offset income losses. However, inequality increases government spending 
multipliers, raising output, investments and income. Balamatsias (2017b) uses an NK 
macroeconomic model of an economy with imperfectly competitive goods market due 
to firms’ market power and inequality due to skill and wage differences and examines 
their impact on government spending multipliers, output and expenditure. Results 
show that government spending multipliers are always greater than unity due to 
imperfect competition and inequality since in highly unequal economies more people 
have a higher MPC. As a result, the net increase in output and expenditure caused by 
increasing government spending is greater in more unequal economies. 
   Finally, the combined effect of democracy and globalization has been the subject of 
many studies and authors. Schulze and Ursprung (1999) review the literature on the 
impact of globalization on fiscal policies and the effect of political competition 
combined with economic integration. According to this survey, government 
expenditures under globalization, particularly welfare spending have not been reduced 
because they protect workers from economic uncertainty, unemployment and income 
losses which are caused by market integration. In addition, government spending on 
economic activities such as infrastructure, energy production and manufacturing as 
well as spending on production of public goods and services such as education has 
remained relatively stable because it raises productivity, output and profitability in an 
economy and helps attract private capital. Furthermore, democracy has a positive 
effect on government spending even in a globalized economic environment because 
median voters demand compensation and provision of public goods for worker and 
firms in sectors which are exposed to risks associated with globalization. 
       
    
3 Theoretical considerations 
 
   This section elaborates on the theoretical link between democracy and government 
spending in order to formalize the testable empirical implications of the theoretical 
literature. At first sight, this model may appear simple, maybe even simplistic. But 
our goal is not theory for its own sake. We simply use theory to guide our empirical 
investigation. This model simply helps us explain how the political system in a 
country affects the size and composition of government expenditure. 
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   We assume that we have a country ruled by an autocrat. The economy is populated 
by a continuum of identical individuals indexed by i that do not have any control over 
government choices. Individuals in the economy own the capital stock which they 
rent to firms; in addition, they supply labour to firms. They consume a single 
consumption good produced by the firms as well as a public good produced by the 
government. The utility of the representative individual i when an autocracy is in 
place is given by the following function: 
   ,,, log ciii GCU     (1) 
 
   Where ,iC  and ,ciG  are the quantities of the private and public consumption goods 
respectively. Consumption of private goods equals the income that individuals receive 
from labour and capital i.e.: 
 
 ,, ii YC     (2) 
 
   Where ,iY  equals the income people receive from labour and income when under 
an autocratic regime. 
   Firms in the economy use labour and capital supplied by individuals in the economy 
in order to produce a single consumption good. In addition to these two inputs, firms 
also use public capital which is provided by the government. The production function 
is a simple Cobb-Douglas function with public and private capital: 
    akaaaa GLAKGLKQ ,)1(,,    (3) 
 
   Where A  is the total factor productivity, aK capital in the economy, aL labour and 
,kG the public capital produced by the government, under an autocratic regime. It is 
easy to prove that, since both capital and labour are owned by the economy’s 
population, the total income received by the individuals in the economy equals total 
output: 
 
aa QY    (4) 
 
   Government in our model is endowed with a fixed budget B which is allocated 
between producing government consumption goods ( aciG , ), government capital ( akG , ) 
and rents (R) which are used solely by the elite similarly to Hausken, Martin and 
Plümper (2004): 
 
RGGB kaci  ,,     (5) 
 
   In an autocracy rents compose a large part of the government budget compared to 
democracies; on the other hand democratic governments allocate recourses according 
to the choice of the majority; therefore under a democratic regime the sum of the 
government budget is used to produce public capital and public goods and rents are 
equal to zero. 
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   In the beginning of each period the economy’s population can choose to stage a 
revolution and take power in their hands by establishing a democracy. We assume that 
once a revolt takes place it is always successful; however it comes at a cost as in 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000b) where a share   of private capital, and labour is 
destroyed as a result of the revolutionary process. As a result only the remaining share 
)1(   is used in production. The above imply that the new quantities of private 
capital ( dK ) and labour ( dL ) in a democracy are equal to: 
   ad KK  1   (6) 
 
ad LL )1(    (7) 
 
   Public capital and public consumption goods are also similarly affected, however 
since the political system in place now is a democratic the share of the government 
budget which was used for rents (R) is now used to produce public capital and public 
consumption goods. Consequently the quantity of public consumption goods and well 
as public capital can now be less than, equal to, or greater than it was before. 
Assuming that a percentage λ of the rents is used to increase public capital and (1-λ) 
to increase public consumption goods, we formulate the following relationships about 
public capital ( dkG , ), public consumption goods ( dciG , ) and total output in the 
economy respectively (  GLKQd ,, ), under a democratic regime: 
 
RGG akdk   ,, )1(   (8) 
 
RGG acidci )1()1( ,,     (9) 
    dkadadd GLAKGLKQ ,)1(,,    (10) 
 
   Finally the utility of the representative citizen i under a democratic regime is equal 
to: 
  dcididi GCU ,,, log    (11) 
 
   In this model, the decision to revolt and install a democracy is made by the citizens 
once they examine the effect that democratization will have on output and income, but 
more importantly on consumption and utility. We denote the probability that a 
country i exits from autocracy and installs a democracy in time period t as  1,0, tcD , 
where 0 means that country c remains an autocracy and 1 that country c becomes a 
democracy. We then obtain the following relationship: 
 






,,
,,
, 1
0
idi
idi
tc UUif
UUif
D        (12) 
 
   According to (12) if increased government spending cannot compensate for the 
losses the economy would suffer as a result of the revolutionary process and increase 
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citizens’ utility then 0, tcD  and citizens choose not to revolt and the country’s 
regime remains autocratic. If instead increased government spending not only can 
compensate for the losses the economy suffers due to the revolutionary process but 
can also increase the utility of citizens then 1, tcD  and citizens choose to revolt and 
install a democracy. 
 
4. Data and methodology 
 
4.1 Data 
 
   In order to construct our main dependent variable we will use a classification of 
government expenditures based on Profeta, Puglisi and Scabrosetti (2013). More 
specifically we group government expenditures in four separate categories which we 
will then interchangeably use as our dependent variable: Government expenditure on 
production of public goods and services (General spending) spending on healthcare 
(Health spending) spending on education, (Education spending) and finally spending 
on social protection (Social protection spending). 
   Data on expenditure are taken from the IMF government finance statistics as 
percentage of GDP. 
 
4.2 Construction of the regime measure 
 
   In this section, we specify the methodology we use to measure and construct our 
political regime variable which will help us illustrate how democracy affects 
government spending. Previous research has treated a country’s political system as a 
exogenous variable only influenced by sociopolitical and economic conditions within 
a single country and unaffected by the conditions in other countries (Helliwell (1994), 
Rodrik (1999) Persson and Tabellini (2006), Aidt and Jensen (2009), Mutascu 
(2011)). Among the few authors who have examined how political regimes in other 
countries influence a country’s own political system, Persson and Tabellini (2009) use 
neighbours’ inverse distance-weighted democracy indexes to control for democratic 
transitions.  
   Our empirical strategy makes completely different assumptions about democracy 
and has not been used before in examining the relationship between democracy and 
government spending. More specifically, we use the theory of Huntington (1991) and 
the method of Acemoglu, Naidu, Restpero and Robinson (2014) and Balamatsias 
(2017a) about regional democratization waves. According to this theory, 
democratization or reversals to autocracy occur in regional waves because countries 
in the same region have common historical backgrounds and share close economic, 
political and cultural ties. Therefore the diffusion of demand for or discontent with a 
political system is much easier to happen in countries in the same geographical area. 
These regional patterns reflect the diffusion of a political regime across countries and 
affect the strength of political systems. Following this theory, we construct a single 
dichotomous variable used to define a country as democratic or autocratic and a jack-
knifed average of the democracy index for all other countries in the same 
geographical area to examine how the political system of countries in the same area 
affects a country’s political system. We then use this jack-knifed average as the 
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instrumental variable in a 2SLS estimation and examine its impact on a country’s 
political regime and spending policies.  
   Following Acemoglu, Naidu, Restpero and Robinson (2014) and Balamatsias 
(2017a) we use data from the Polity IV project and Freedom House. We choose to 
rely on these two datasets because they are the most complete in terms of the number 
of countries and timeline covered, but more importantly because they collect 
information about each country’s institutional components in order to categorize them 
as democratic or autocratic. More specifically Polity IV uses data on free elections, 
the existence of legal limitations to the exercise of executive power by a government 
and its chief executives and inclusive participation and representation by political 
parties. Freedom House uses an index related to the protection of civil and political 
rights in a country.1 
   Based on the datasets of Polity IV and Freedom House and on Acemoglu, Naidu, 
Restpero and Robinson (2014) and Balamatsias (2017a) we build a measure of the 
political regime Dct ∈ {0,1} for a country c on time t. More specifically the political 
system in a country is defined as autocratic or democratic by employing a single 
dichotomous variable Dct ∈ {0,1} where 0 means that the country in question is an 
autocracy and 1 means that the country is a democracy. We calculate the regime 
variable using the following specification:     
   We code a country c as democratic (Dct =1) in year t if Polity IV gives it a positive 
score (The Polity IV index takes prices between -10 and +10) or if Freedom House 
categorizes the country as “Free” or “Partially Free”. Alternatively, if a country 
receives a negative score on Polity IV or is categorized as “Not Free” in Freedom 
House then it is coded as autocratic (Dct =0).     
   Finally, in order to test the robustness of our estimation technique we also employ a 
continuous rather than a dichotomous variable in order to denote a country as 
democratic or autocratic. For this reason, we simply employ the Polity IV scores as 
our democracy index. Using this dataset, we code a country c in year t as democratic 
if it has a value between 1 and 10 in Polity IV (Dct ∈ {1,10}). Countries given a 
value of -1 to -10 in the Polity IV dataset are coded as autocratic (Dct ∈ {-1,-10}). 
 
 
4.3 Control Variables 
 
   In addition to our main explanatory variable we use a number of control variables in 
order to ensure a robust econometric result. These are some of the factors which the 
relative literature considers having some kind of effect on government spending aside 
from the political regime. Data for all the control variables we use come from the 
World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI), the IMF Government Finance 
Statistics and the OECD public sector, taxation and market regulation databases. We 
also use simple historical data based on election dates and the political history of our 
sample countries in order to construct two of our dummy control variables. 
   More specifically we use data on GDP per capita (income), expressed in constant 
2010 US$ prices. This variable allows us to control for the overall productivity and 
wealth in an economy and how this affects spending policies. We expect the effect of 
this variable to be positive for most of our dependent variables because higher per 
                                               
1 For a more detailed analysis on the institutional variations used to categorize countries as democracies 
and autocracies, see Acemoglu, Naidu, Restpero and Robinson (2014) and Balamatsias (2017a) 
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capita income is associated with increased government spending for redistribution, 
production of public goods and government investments.      
   In addition we use data on economic integration (openness) by using the sum of 
imports and exports as percentage of GDP. This variable will probably have a positive 
effect on Social protection spending, Education spending and General spending 
because economic integration increases spending on welfare programs in order to 
lower economic uncertainty and unemployment as well as production of public goods 
which increase output and productivity and help attract capital. 
   An additional dataset which we make use of is that of income inequality (inequality) 
by using the Gini index. We expect a positive relationship between this variable and 
our dependent variables because greater economic inequality is associated with 
increased government spending, because median voters in democracies demand 
redistributive government expenditure and also because inequality increases the size 
of government spending multipliers.. We also control for the population of a country 
(population). We expect that population will have a positive effect on government 
spending because income inequality tends to increase when the population increases 
and also because of median voter pressure for redistribution.        
   In order to achieve the best overall fit for our estimation we also employ a number 
of variables which are typically considered as having an effect on macroeconomic 
policy. We use data on gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP (Investment) 
following the hypothesis that productive government spending and private investment 
acts as complementaries while other types of public spending crowd out investment 
(Argimón, González-Páramo and Alegre (1995), Xu and Yan (2014)). We also 
employ data on the number of people over the age of 65 as a percentage of the entire 
population (Elderly) a variable which we believe has a positive effect on government 
spending due to increased demand for government welfare programs from older 
people (Lassila, Valnoken and Alho (2014), Bloom et. al. (2015)). We will also use 
data on higher educational attainment (Education) as in Mutascu and Danuletiu 
(2013) and three dummy variables: Socialist a dummy variable equal to 1 if a country 
was a former socialist state and 0 otherwise, (Rodrik (1999)).We also use data on 
election years (elections) a variable equal to 1 in year t if a country holds elections 
and equal to 0 otherwise (Drazen and Elsava (2010)) Finally we use a dummy on oil 
exports as percentage of GDP (oil exporter) which gives a country a value of 1 if it 
collects revenues from oil equal to 30% of GDP or higher and 0 otherwise, (Fearon 
and Laitin (2003)).  
 
 
4.4 Descriptive statistics 
 
   Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for our dependent and our independent 
control variables. Table 2 is the correlation matrix of our variables 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
[Table 2 here] 
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4.5 Econometric model 
 
   The main econometric equation we will use in order to examine the effect of the 
political regime in a country’s government spending will be based on Acemoglu, 
Naidu, Restpero and Robinson (2014) and Balamatsias (2017a). Following this 
method we will be making use of a Two–stage least squares (2SLS) regression. In the 
first stage we will be using an instrumental variables (IV) regression with a country’s 
political regime index (Democracy) as the dependent variable. This index will be 
based on the index seen in Acemoglu, Naidu, Restpero and Robinson (2014) and 
Balamatsias (2017a) which is constructed using data on political and civil liberties 
and which was explained in greater detail in section 4.2. The instrumental variable 
will be a jack-knifed average of this democracy index in all countries in the same 
geographical area. We construct a panel dataset made by 61 countries from 1993 to 
2012. Data on government spending as well as all control variables will be expressed 
in logarithmic form.  
 
 
4.6 Basic econometric specification   
 
   The basic estimation that we will use in order to examine the effect of a country’s 
political regime on its government spending is based on the estimation used in 
Balamatsias (2017a): 
 
ctcctitctct ContolsDemocracyaSpending    1110   (1) 
 
   Where Spendingct represents interchangeably general government spending, 
spending on education, spending on healthcare, and social protection spending. 
Democracyct-1 is the democracy index of country c time for the time period t-1. 
Controlsct-1 stands for the set of control variables of country c for the time period t-1. 
We also control for country and time effects which are denoted respectively by γc and 
δt. Finally εct is the error term and αο our constant. 
    In order to properly capture the effect of democracy on tax revenues, we employ 
instrumental variables (IV) estimation. The reason we are using this specific method 
is that, as we have seen in Wintrobe (2001), Acemoglu and Robinson (2000a, 2000b) 
and Hausken, Martin and Plumper (2004) the size and composition of government 
expenditure can bring transitions to democracy and at the same time democratic 
transitions can bring increases in government spending. Therefore it is safe to assume 
that these two variables have a two-way causal relationship between them where both 
of them influence and can be influenced by the other.      
   For the reasons stated above, and in order to properly examine the impact of 
democracy on government spending, which is our main explanatory variable, we 
make use of the methodology of Acemoglu, Naidu, Restpero, and Robinson (2014) 
and Balamatsias (2017a). Following this methodology, we use the regional waves of 
democratization and the regional transitions to autocracies as an instrumental variable 
that influences the endogenous variable, Democracy-1. We posit that democracy in 
country c is influenced by the political regime in other countries which are in the 
same geographical area as country c. To formally investigate these patterns we begin 
by defining the set of countries that influence demand for democracy in a given 
country. For every country c, we use the country’s democracy index at the start of our 
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sample, Dct0 to denote this country’s political regime (democracy or autocracy). Then 
we use Rc to denote the geographical region in which country c lies. Democracy in 
country c is influenced by democracy in the set of countries Ic = {c′: c′ ≠ c, Rc′ = Rc, 
Dc′t0 = Dct0}. This set includes all countries which are in the same region as country c 
that share a common political history. 
   Using these sets we define the regional influence to democratize that country c 
faces, Zct with the following equation: 



Icc
tc
c
ct DI
Z '
1
              (2) 
    
   Where Zct is the jack-knifed average of democracy in a region times the initial 
regime cell, which leaves out the own country observation. This equation shows how 
the political system in a given country is affected by the regimes in countries in the 
same geographical area by creating diffusion of demand for or discontent with a 
political system. 
    Using (2) gives us our first stage equation we will use: 
 
      u 1-ct 1j1   ctctDemocracy         (3) 
 
   Combining (1) and (3) we have the two-stage least squares panel data model which 
we estimate: 
 
ctcctitctct ContolsDemocracyaSpending    1110                                                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                                                                                (4)                                                                                                      
      u 1-ct1j1   ctctDemocracy                                                
 
5. Results 
 
       The sample that we use consists of 61 countries from 1993 to 2012. All of our 
regressions have been made using robust standard errors. We first run an ordinary 
least squares (OLS) model. However OLS does not control for unobserved individual 
effects in the countries we use in our sample nor does it control for the potential 
endogeneity of our main explanatory variable. For this reason we will also use a 
simple fixed effects (F.E.) regression, an Arellano-Bond (GMM) regression and a two 
stage least square (2SLS) fixed effects regression with country and time effects. This 
way we can control not only for individual unobservable effects in our sample of 
countries but also for the endogeneity of the main explanatory variable, Democracy-1.  
    Regarding our postestimation tests we run a Wooldridge test and a Crag Donald F-
statistic test to check for serial correlation and to see if the instruments we use are 
valid i.e. not correlated with the error term respectively. The results show that there 
exists no serial correlation, that we have valid instruments and that the excluded 
instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equations. We also run an 
endogeneity test to check if we need to use 2SLS regression or if a simple OLS model 
will suffice. The results indicate that a 2SLS model is in fact the model we need to 
use. Finally we want to ensure that our instrumental variables have not direct effect on 
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our dependent variables, in other words we want to ensure that there exists no 
imperfect exogeneity. This can be easily tested if, Following Baum (2008) we simply 
include our instrumental variable as a repressor both in our OLS and in our fixed 
effects estimations. We find that Zct-1 negatively affects Social protection spending at 
a 10% significance level in the OLS estimation with a very big coefficient (-0.226). 
Therefore we can safely conclude that imperfect exogeneity is not an important 
problem in our estimations of General spending, Education spending and Health 
spending since it only seems to affect Social protection spending.   
   In the following tables we present our estimation results. Each one of the columns 
presents the results when the dependent variable is respectively General spending, 
Education spending Health spending and Social protection spending. We begin our 
analysis by estimating the OLS and the fixed effects (F.E.) estimators for each one of 
our dependent variables interchangeably. Following that we run an Arellano-Bond 
GMM estimation. We then run a 2SLS fixed effects regression, which we present in 
two tables; the first table gives us the results of the first stage regression and the 
second table the results of our second stage regression. We begin with Table 3, which 
gives us the results of our OLS regression. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
   In Table 3, we present our OLS estimations. Our main finding is that Democracy-1 
positively affects Education spending and Social protection spending at a 1% 
significance level, negatively affects General spending also at a 1% significance level 
while Health spending seems to be unaffected by this index.. The magnitude of the 
coefficients is also quite big, being 0.102 for Education spending, 0.269 for Social 
protection spending and 0.051 for General spending. We also find evidence that 
regional democratization waves, presented here by our variable Zct-1 do not have a 
direct impact on most spending variables; the only exception being the positive effect 
they have on Social protection spending. The magnitude of this coefficient is also 
very big, (-0.226) so the direct effect of regional democratization waves on social 
protection is quite significant.  
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
Our estimation for the fixed effects estimations are given in Table 4. As seen from the 
results Democracy-1 has a positive effect on General spending at a 10% significance, 
level with a coefficient of 0.064; however none of the other dependent variables area 
affected by this variable. Looking at the effect of our control variables we find that 
most of them perform as we expect them to, according to the relevant literature.   
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
   Table 5 gives us the results of our Arellano-Bond GMM estimation. We used two-
period time lags for our democracy index and a single period time lag of our 
government spending variables in order to deal with issues of autocorrelation and 
acjieve the best overall fit for our estimation. The main finding in this estimation is 
that our democracy index Democracy-1 has a positive impact on General spending at a 
10% significance level, and a negative effect on Health spending and Social 
protection spending at a 10% and 1% significance level respectively. Furthermore, 
past government spending, presented here by the Spending-1 seems to have a 
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significant impact on current spending policies. More specifically we can see that 
Spending-1 positively affects General spending (0.526),  Education spending (0.564), 
Health spending (0.495) and Social protection spending (0.552), all at a 1% 
significance level. When it comes to our control variables we find that most of them 
do not have an effect on our spending variables. 
 
[Table 6a here] 
 
[Table 6b here] 
 
Our main findings are given in Tables 6a and 6b, where we present the results of our 
2SLS estimation in which we used our regional waves of democratization index as 
our instrumental variable. We begin with our first stage estimation, given in Table 6a 
and then we move on to our second stage results in Table 6b.  
   Looking at the results in Table 6a we see that the impact of regional 
democratization waves index Zct-1, is statistically significant at a 1% level in all our 
specifications, being 0.518 for General spending, Education spending and Health 
spending, and 0.545 for Social protection spending. This result indicates that regional 
waves of democratization have a positive and highly significant effect on a country’s 
political system; a result which appears to be in accordance with the theory of 
Huntington (1991) as well as the methodology used by Acemoglu, Naidu, Restpero 
and Robinson (2014) and Balamatsias (2017a) about the positive impact of regional 
waves of democratization on a country’s political regime.    
    In Table 6b we present our second stage results. The most important finding is that 
Democracy-1 has a positive effect on General spending at a 10% significance level, 
with a coefficient of 0.285. Education spending is also positively affected by 
Democracy-1 at a 5% significance level with the coefficient being even bigger, at 
0.407. These results seem to suggest that democracy increases government 
expenditure used for producing goods and general services and also increases 
spending on education. This outcome can be explained by that fact that these 
expenditure types can be effectively utilized by firms and individuals in order to 
increase productivity and output in the economy and decrease inequality (Meltzer and 
Richards (1981, 1983), Boix (2001)) as well as help governments attract foreign 
capital by improving output, productivity and profitability (Schulze and Ursprung 
(1999)). Concerning the rest of our independent variables, we observe that they affect 
spending as predicted by the relevant literature the only exceptions being Inequality-1 
Oil exporter-1 and Elections-1 which do not have any effect on our spending variables 
and Education-1 which has a negative effect on General spending. 
   Next, we examine the robustness of our main result. For this reason, we will run 
three additional estimations. In the first one, we run a regression where instead of a 
dichotomous democracy index we use a continuous one, in this case, the Polity IV 
scores for our sample countries. In the second regression, we exclude all countries 
from Africa and the Middle East. Finally, in the third regression, we use a much 
smaller sample consisting only of non-OECD countries. 
 
[Table 7a here] 
 
[Table 7b here] 
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    Tables 7a and 7b present the estimates when using our continuous index for the 
regional waves of democratization. Looking at the results of our second stage 
regressions in Table 7a we find some considerable differences from our main results. 
More specifically, the effect of regional waves of democratization Zct-1 is now 
negative at a 1% level of statistical significance in all our regressions. Additionally we 
see that the magnitude is now bigger, being -0.433 for General spending Education 
spending and Health spending, and -0.383 for Social protection spending.     
   The results of our second stage regressions are given in Table 7b. Democracy-1 now 
has a negative effect on General spending (-0.054) as well as on Education spending 
(-0.091) both at a 5% significance level. These results further, as well as those in 
Table 7a, are completely different from the theoretical and empirical results of a 
positive relationship between regional waves of democratization and a country’s 
political system seen in Huntington (1991), Acemoglu, Naidu, Restpero and Robinson 
(2014) and Balamatsias (2017a). In addition, these results cast some doubt on the 
positive impact that democracy has on government spending reported by a number of 
authors (Boix (2001), Meltzer and Richards (1981, 1983) Schulze and Ursprung 
(1999)) and by our baseline 2SLS OLS, fixed effects and GMM regressions.    
 
[Table 8a here] 
 
[Table 8b here] 
 
   The results of Tables 8a and 8b are extracted when we exclude North African and 
Middle-Eastern countries from our sample. The results of Table 8a show us that even 
in this smaller sample, regional democratization waves, (Zct-1) still have a positive and 
statistically significant effect on our democracy index, but at a 5% significance level 
for all our regressions. Furthermore, when looking at the impact of Democracy-1 on 
government spending it seems that it positively affects General spending at a 5% 
significance level, with a much bigger coefficient of 1.047. Education spending is 
also positively affected by Democracy-1 at a 5% significance level with the coefficient 
being even bigger, at 1.463. These results indicate that government spending mostly 
increases in wealthier democracies where per capita incomes are higher and where the 
majority of the population belongs to the middle-income class because only middle-
class people can effectively use public goods and services to increase output and 
incomes and decrease inequality, and as a result vote in favour of increasing 
expenditure, as seen in Meltzer and Richards (1981,1983) and in Boix (2001). The 
rest of our control variables affect government spending as suggested by the relevant 
literature. 
 
[Table 9a here] 
 
[Table 9b here] 
 
   Finally, we make use of a much smaller sample, comprised of non-OECD countries, 
the results of which are given in Tables 9a and 9b. The first stage results in Table 9a 
shows that the effect of regional waves of democratization remains statistically 
significant at a 1% level as in our baseline estimations. Additionally, we see that the 
magnitude is somewhat bigger compared to our baseline estimation, being 0.657 for 
General spending, Education spending and Health spending, and 0.083 for our Social 
protection spending first stage estimations. 
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   The results of our second stage regression, given in Table 9b, show us that 
Democracy-1 has no statistically significant effect on any of our dependent variables 
These results further substantiate that poorer democracies do not generally increase 
government expenditure and that increasing state spending is a habit of wealthier 
more developed democracies as seen in Meltzer and Richards (1981, 1983) and Boix 
(2001). 
   To sum up, our empirical results using a number of different specifications and 
robustness tests, seem to verify our main assumption that regional waves of 
democratization in a geographical area increase discontent with autocracy and 
demand for democracy within a country, in line with the theory of Huntington (1991) 
and the methodology used Acemoglu, Naidu, Restpero and Robinson (2014) and 
Balamatsias (2017a) about regional democratization waves. In addition, our findings 
in the second stage estimation show us that democratic regimes seem to increase 
government spending on education and production of goods and services but mostly 
in richer countries because voters in wealthier democracies are in favour of increased 
production of public goods and services in order to increase productivity and output in 
the economy and to decrease inequality (Meltzer and Richards ((1981, 1983), Boix 
(2001)) as well as attract foreign capital (Schulze and Ursprung (1999)).  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we investigate the effect of regional waves of democratization on a 
country’s democracy and the effect of democracy on government spending. The 
analysis is carried out using a dataset of 61 countries from 1993 to 2012.  We use the 
information on the political regime of countries in the same geographical area in order 
to build an index of regional waves of democratization like the one used by 
Acemoglu, Naidu, Restpero and Robinson (2014) and Balamatsias (2017a), based on 
the theory of Huntington (1991). These waves represent the demand for or discontent 
with a given political system in countries in the same geographical area. We then use 
this regional democratization index as an instrumental variable in a two-stage fixed 
effects regression with democracy used as the endogenous variable and try to find the 
impact of democracy on spending policies. Our first stage estimation shows that 
regional waves of democratization positively affect a country’s political regime as in 
Huntington (1991), Acemoglu, Naidu, Restpero and Robinson (2014) and Balamatsias 
(2017a). The results of our main 2SLS estimation, as well as our OLS, fixed effects 
and GMM estimations, show us that democracy increases government spending used 
for producing public goods and public services and government spending on 
education. When controlling for a  smaller dataset, which does not include African 
and Middle-eastern countries our first-stage results remain the same while the positive 
effect of democracy on government spending is now quantitatively much bigger 
suggesting wealthier democracies produce more public goods and services when 
compared to poorer ones. This hypothesis is further substantiated when we use a 
smaller sample consisting of non-OECD countries and find no statistically significant 
effect of democracy on government spending. Therefore, we conclude that democracy 
increases government expenditure on developed countries because individuals and 
firms in these countries use government spending more effectively to increase 
productivity and output, decrease inequality and attract foreign capital leading the 
majority of citizens in these countries to vote in favour of greater spending.        
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   To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that examines the two-way 
causal relationship between government spending and democracy, since authors in the 
past focused only on how spending affects political regimes, or simply on how 
democracy affects expenditure. In addition, our paper is the first one, which uses 
regional waves of democratization and examines their effect on a country’s political 
regime and on expenditure policies. Therefore, our findings contribute to the well-
established literature about the relationship between government expenditure and 
democracy and on the determinants of spending policies. Clearly, these results and 
their policy implications call for a deeper understanding of the intra- and inter-country 
mechanisms which affect government spending and fiscal policy in general and call 
for future research on the subject. 
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7. Appendix 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics for the main variables 
Variable Description Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Source Expected Sign 
General spending General 
spending on 
public goods 
and services 
(%GDP) 
1030 9.944 4.239 0 50.598 Calculations based on 
Profeta, Puglisi and 
Scabrosetti (2013) 
 
Education spending Spending on 
education 
(%GDP) 
1029 3.427 2.134 0 23.479 Calculations based on 
Profeta, Puglisi and 
Scabrosetti (2013) 
 
Health spending Spending on 
healthcare 
(%GDP) 
1029 3.992 2.547 0.145 20.44 Calculations based on 
Profeta, Puglisi and 
Scabrosetti (2013) 
 
Social protection 
spending 
Spending on 
social welfare  
(%GDP) 
1029 8.543 7.021 0 37.543 Calculations based on 
Profeta, Puglisi and 
Scabrosetti (2013) 
 
Democracy Democracy 
index dummy 
1240 0.862 0.344 0 1 Calculations based on 
Acemoglu, Naidu, Restpero 
and Robinson (2014) 
Positive 
Democracy(polity) Polity IV index 1220 7.023 
 
2.755 -10 10 Polity IV dataset Positive 
Zct Jack-knifed 
average of 
democracy 
index 
1240 0.864 0.171 0.333 1 Calculations based on 
Acemoglu, Naidu, Restpero 
and Robinson (2014) 
No effect 
Zctpolity Jack-knifed 
average of 
Polity IV index 
1220 7.023 2.755 0 9.517 Calculations based on 
Acemoglu, Naidu, Restpero 
and Robinson (2014) 
No effect 
Gini Gini index 1046 39.908 1.650 36.564 46.217 World Bank development 
indicators 
Positive 
Income GDP per capita 1224 17435.13 18534.83 375.14 91593.63 World Bank development 
indicators 
Positive 
Openness Exports plus 
imports(%GDP) 
1228 51.400 25.970 16.062 204.585 World Bank development 
indicators 
Positive 
Investment Gross capital 
formation 
(%GDP) 
1218 23.601 7.121 0.298 67.910 World Bank development 
indicators 
Negative 
Population Total population 1240 4.84e+07 1.45e+08 242000 1.26e+09 World Bank development 
indicators 
Positive 
Elderly People over the 
age of 65 (% of 
population) 
1220 10.673 5.175 2.045 21.163 World Bank development 
indicators 
Positive 
Education Tertiary 
education 
enrolment 
(%gross) 
995 45.73 23.47 0.208 110.26 World Bank development 
indicators 
Ambiguous 
Socialist Socialist dummy 1220 0.25 0.433 0 1 Historical data Negative 
Election Election year 
dummy 
1220 0.240 0.427 0 1 Historical data Positive 
Oil exporter Major oil 
exporter dummy 
1218 0.343 0.474 0 1 World Bank development 
indicators 
Positive 
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Table 2: Correlation matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 1.00                  
2 0.25 1.00                 
3 0.30 0.74 1.00                
4 0.28 0.82 0.58 1.00               
5 0.07 0.32 0.16 0.35 1.00              
6 0.02 0.34 0.18 0.39 0.61 1.00             
7 0.16 0.43 0.23 0.47 0.38 0.25 1.00            
8 0.10 0.44 0.22 0.46 0.42 0.32 0.85 1.00           
9 0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 1.00          
10 -0.06 0.48 0.13 0.50 0.26 0.29 0.34 0.36 -
0.05 
1.00         
11 -0.17 0.03 0.09 0.01 -0.08 -0.07 0.04 0.16 -
0.03 
0.05 1.00        
12 -0.16 -0.15 -0.04 -0.21 -0.08 -0.02 -0.10 0.01 -
0.11 
-
0.18 
0.09 1.00       
13 0.07 -0.15 -0.23 -0.22 0.01 -0.12 -0.18 -0.14 0.01 -
0.13 
0.31 0.07 1.00      
14 0.12 0.51 0.17 0.64 0.39 0.34 0.68 0.71 -
0.07 
0.52 -
0.03 
-0.06 -0.25 1.00     
15 -0.03 0.42 0.19 0.46 0.21 0.18 0.41 0.50 -
0.08 
0.56 0.03 -0.08 -0.16 0.68 1.00    
16 -0.05 -0.10 -0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.21 0.26 -
0.01 
-
0.41 
0.24 0.18 -0.15 0.21 0.03 1.00   
17 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 1.00  
18 0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.15 -0.17 -0.36 -0.13 -0.13 -
0.03 
0.01 -
0.19 
-0.14 0.25 -0.13 0.07 -
0.09 
0.01 1.00 
Notes: 1=General spending, 2=Education spending, 3=Health spending, 4=Social 
protection spending, 5=Democracy, 6=Democracy(polity), 6=Zct, 7=Zctpolity, 8=Gini, 
9=Income, 10=Openness,  
11=Investment, 12=Population 13,=Elderly, 14=Education, 15= Education, 16= Socialist, 
17= Elections, 18= Oil exporter 
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Table 3: OLS regressions 
 OLS-General 
spending 
OLS-Education 
spending 
OLS-Health spending OLS-Social protection 
spending 
Democracy-1 
 
 
Zct-1 
 
 
Inequality-1 
 
 
Income-1 
 
 
Investment-1 
 
 
Education-1 
 
 
Openness-1 
 
 
Population-1 
 
 
Elderly-1 
 
 
Socialist-1 
 
 
Elections-1 
 
 
Oil exporter-1 
 
-0.051*** 
(0.020) 
 
0.072 
(0.057) 
 
-0.106 
(0.330) 
 
-0.070*** 
(0.022) 
 
-0.179*** 
(0.052) 
 
-0.091*** 
(0.032) 
 
-0.067 
(0.043) 
 
0.041*** 
(0.014) 
 
0.359*** 
(0.059) 
 
-0.032* 
(0.018) 
 
0.008 
(0.013) 
 
-0.053*** 
(0.014) 
0.102*** 
(0.043) 
 
-0.093 
(0.126) 
 
-0.016 
(0.723) 
 
0.090* 
(0.048) 
 
-0.196* 
(0.114) 
 
0.224*** 
(0.070) 
 
-0.139 
(0.094) 
 
-0.198*** 
(0.025) 
 
-0.219* 
(0.130) 
 
-0.006 
(0.040) 
 
-0.003 
(0.028) 
 
-0.027 
(0.031) 
0.089 
(0.063) 
 
0.141 
(0.182) 
 
-1.508 
(1.047) 
 
0.207*** 
(0.070) 
 
-0.598*** 
(0.165) 
 
-0.022 
(0.102) 
 
-0.211 
(0.136) 
 
-0.191*** 
(0.036) 
 
0.448** 
(0.188) 
 
0.069 
(0.058) 
 
0.032 
(0.041) 
 
0.078* 
(0.046) 
0.269*** 
(0.053) 
 
-0.226* 
(0.153) 
 
0.015 
(0.866) 
 
0.366*** 
(0.058) 
 
-0.731*** 
(0.142) 
 
0.375*** 
(0.084) 
 
-0.020 
(0.112) 
 
-0.025 
(0.031) 
 
0.610*** 
(0.154) 
 
0.245*** 
(0.048) 
 
0.020 
(0.034) 
 
-0.019 
(0.037) 
R squared 
 
N 
 
F-test 
 
0.150 
 
714 
 
10.33 
 
 
 
 
0.199 
 
714 
 
14.57 
 
 
 
 
0.245 
 
714 
 
19.04 
 
 
 
 
0.547 
 
687 
 
67.96 
 
 
 
 
Note: The table presents estimated coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All 
estimations are regressed using robust standard errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 4: Fixed effects (F.E) regressions 
 F.E-General 
spending 
F.E-Education 
spending 
F.E-Health spending F.E-Social protection spending 
Democracy-1 
 
 
Zct-1 
 
 
Inequality-1 
 
 
Income-1 
 
 
Investment-1 
 
 
Education-1 
 
 
Openness-1 
 
 
Population-1 
 
 
Elderly-1 
 
 
Socialist-1 
 
 
Elections-1 
 
 
Oil exporter-1 
 
0.064** 
(0.025) 
 
0.114 
(0.078) 
 
-0.246 
(0.243) 
 
0.054*** 
(0.062) 
 
-0.198*** 
(0.058) 
 
-0.218*** 
(0.055) 
 
0.053 
(0.083) 
 
-0.063 
(0.052) 
 
0.312 
(0.195) 
 
-0.025 
(0.055) 
 
0.012 
(0.008) 
 
-0.017 
(0.022) 
-0.011 
(0.028) 
 
0.217 
(0.086) 
 
-0.005 
(0.269) 
 
0.163** 
(0.069) 
 
-0.094 
(0.064) 
 
0.037 
(0.061) 
 
0.097 
(0.092) 
 
0.114** 
(0.058) 
 
-0.417* 
(0.217) 
 
0.032 
(0.061) 
 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
 
-0.032 
(0.024) 
-0.145*** 
(0.032) 
 
-0.056 
(0.101) 
 
0.471 
(0.314) 
 
-0.016 
(0.080) 
 
0.088 
(0.064) 
 
1.039*** 
(0.144) 
 
0.078 
(0.108) 
 
0.240*** 
(0.067) 
 
0.780*** 
(0.252) 
 
0.113 
(0.071) 
 
0.007 
(0.011) 
 
-0.017 
(0.028) 
-0.203*** 
(0.033) 
 
0.148 
(0.115) 
 
-0.172 
(0.347) 
 
-0.076 
(0.087) 
 
-0.241*** 
(0.084) 
 
0.022 
(0.077) 
 
0.401*** 
(0.122) 
 
0.208*** 
(0.074) 
 
0.819*** 
(0.274) 
 
0.185** 
(0.077) 
 
0.009 
(0.012) 
 
0.028 
(0.031) 
R squared 
 
N 
 
F-test 
 
Wooldridge test 
 
0.07 
 
714 
 
3.66 
 
70.73 
 
 
0.04 
 
714 
 
2.13 
 
66.72 
 
 
0.107 
 
714 
 
6.48 
 
78.78 
 
 
0.166 
 
687 
 
10.28 
 
25.00 
 
 
 
 
Note: The table presents estimated coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All 
estimations are regressed using robust standard errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 5: Arellano-Bond GMM estimation  
 GMM -General 
spending 
GMM-Education 
spending 
GMM-Health 
spending 
GMM-Social protection 
spending 
Spending-1 
 
 
Democracy-1 
 
 
Democracy-2 
 
 
Inequality-1 
 
 
Income-1 
 
 
Investment-1 
 
 
Education-1 
 
 
Openness-1 
 
 
Population-1 
 
 
Elderly-1 
 
 
Socialist-1 
 
 
Elections-1 
 
 
Oil exporter-1 
 
0.526*** 
(0.057) 
 
0.094* 
(0.052) 
 
-0.013 
(0.052) 
 
-0.168 
(0.206) 
 
-0.014 
(0.144) 
 
-0.078 
(0.079) 
 
-0.065 
(0.103) 
 
-0.005 
(0.106) 
 
0.384 
(0.368) 
 
0.152 
(0.326) 
 
-0.016 
(0.092) 
 
0.015** 
(0.006) 
 
-0.043* 
(0.021) 
0.564*** 
(0.059) 
 
-0.053 
(0.051) 
 
0.018 
(0.049) 
 
-0.028 
(0.169) 
 
0.093 
(0.117) 
 
0.013 
(0.066) 
 
0.024 
(0.085) 
 
0.077 
(0.089) 
 
0.107 
(0.296) 
 
-0.197 
(0.269) 
 
0.011 
(0.076) 
 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
 
0.027 
(0.018) 
0.495*** 
(0.055) 
 
-0.175* 
(0.095) 
 
0.021 
(0.066) 
 
-0.220 
(0.254) 
 
0.453** 
(0.183) 
 
-0.009 
(0.100) 
 
-0.195 
(0.127) 
 
-0.018 
(0.132) 
 
-0.307 
(0.457) 
 
0.173 
(0.385) 
 
0.001 
(0.117) 
 
0.014* 
(0.008) 
 
0.068** 
(0.027) 
0.552*** 
(0.067) 
 
-0.159*** 
(0.058) 
 
-0.067 
(0.048) 
 
-0.320 
(0.199) 
 
0.003 
(0.133) 
 
0.023 
(0.080) 
 
0.168* 
(0.097) 
 
-0.028 
(0.103) 
 
0.814** 
(0.374) 
 
-0.381 
(0.298) 
 
-0.114 
(0.069) 
 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
 
0.013 
(0.020) 
N 
 
Wald test 
 
Arellano-bond AR(1) test 
 
Arellano-bond AR(2) test  
 
603 
 
129.81 
 
-7.99 
 
-0.76 
 
603 
 
129.24 
 
-8.44 
 
0.56 
 
603 
 
171.10 
 
-8.91 
 
-0.88 
 
5.77 
 
119.33 
 
-5.09 
 
-1.19 
 
 
 
Note: The table presents estimated coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All 
estimations are regressed using robust standard errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 6a: 2SLS first stage regression 
 First stage 
regression-General 
spending 
First stage regression-
Education spending 
First stage regression-
Health spending 
First stage regression-Social 
protection spending 
Zct-1 
 
 
Inequality-1 
 
 
Income-1 
 
 
Investment-1 
 
 
Education-1 
 
 
Openness-1 
 
 
Population-1 
 
 
Elderly-1 
 
 
Socialist-1 
 
 
Elections-1 
 
 
Oil exporter-1 
 
 
0.518*** 
(0.119) 
 
0.905** 
(0.374) 
 
-0.448*** 
(0.094) 
 
0.293*** 
(0.089) 
 
0.144* 
(0.085) 
 
0.338*** 
(0.129) 
 
0.424*** 
(0.079) 
 
-0.237 
(0.302) 
 
-0.035 
(0.085) 
 
0.004 
(0.013) 
 
-0.069** 
(0.034) 
0.518*** 
(0.119) 
 
0.905** 
(0.374) 
 
-0.448*** 
(0.094) 
 
0.293*** 
(0.089) 
 
0.144* 
(0.085) 
 
0.338*** 
(0.129) 
 
0.424*** 
(0.079) 
 
-0.237 
(0.302) 
 
-0.035 
(0.085) 
 
0.004 
(0.013) 
 
-0.069** 
(0.034) 
0.518*** 
(0.119) 
 
0.905** 
(0.374) 
 
-0.448*** 
(0.094) 
 
0.293*** 
(0.089) 
 
0.144* 
(0.085) 
 
0.338*** 
(0.129) 
 
0.424*** 
(0.079) 
 
-0.237 
(0.302) 
 
-0.035 
(0.085) 
 
0.004 
(0.013) 
 
-0.069** 
(0.034) 
0.545*** 
(0.127) 
 
0.785*** 
(0.368) 
 
-0.459** 
(0.091) 
 
-0.377*** 
(0.138) 
 
0.149 
(0.138) 
 
0.419*** 
(0.129) 
 
0.414*** 
(0.077) 
 
-0.274 
(0.292) 
 
-0.045 
(0.082) 
 
0.001 
(0.013) 
 
-0.069** 
(0.033) 
 
N 
 
F-Test 
 
712 
 
18.75 
 
 
 
 
712 
 
18.75 
 
 
 
 
712 
 
18.75 
 
 
 
 
685 
 
20.32 
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Table 6b: 2SLS second stage regression 
 2SLS-General 
spending 
2SLS-Education 
spending 
2SLS-Health 
spending 
2SLS-Social protection 
spending 
Democracy-1 
 
 
Inequality-1 
 
 
Income-1 
 
 
Investment-1 
 
 
Education-1 
 
 
Openness-1 
 
 
Population-1 
 
 
Elderly-1 
 
 
Socialist-1 
 
 
Elections-1 
 
 
Oil exporter-1 
 
0.285* 
(0.156) 
 
-0.447 
(0.309) 
 
0.154* 
(0.090) 
 
-0.263*** 
(0.073) 
 
-0.250*** 
(0.061) 
 
-0.021 
(0.100) 
 
-0.157* 
(0.087) 
 
0.365* 
(0.058) 
 
-0.017 
(0.058) 
 
0.011 
(0.009) 
 
-0.002 
(0.024) 
0.407** 
(0.189) 
 
-0.385 
(0.375) 
 
0.351*** 
(0.109) 
 
-0.217** 
(0.089) 
 
-0.023 
(0.074) 
 
-0.044 
(0.122) 
 
-0.063 
(0.106) 
 
-0.318 
(0.246) 
 
0.047 
(0.070) 
 
-0.003 
(0.011) 
 
-0.003 
(0.030) 
-0.253 
(0.192) 
 
-0.373 
(0.381) 
 
-0.064 
(0.111) 
 
0.018 
(0.090) 
 
0.042 
(0.075) 
 
0.115 
(0.124) 
 
0.286*** 
(0.108) 
 
0.754*** 
(0.250) 
 
0.109 
(0.071) 
 
0.008 
(0.011) 
 
-0.025 
(0.030) 
0.068 
(0.214) 
 
-0.386 
(0.414) 
 
0.048 
(0.125) 
 
-0.317*** 
(0.099) 
 
-0.009 
(0.082) 
 
0.287* 
(0.149) 
 
0.095 
(0.118) 
 
0.894*** 
(0.281) 
 
0.198** 
(0.079) 
 
0.009 
(0.013) 
 
0.047 
(0.034) 
 
N 
 
F-test 
 
R-squared 
 
Endogeneity test 
 
Cragg-Donald test 
 
Wooldridge test 
712 
 
3.06 
 
0.105 
 
21.73 
 
18.75 
 
70.73 
712 
 
1.72 
 
0.129 
 
6.31 
 
18.75 
 
66.72 
712 
 
5.20 
 
0.130 
 
0.31 
 
18.75 
 
78.78 
685 
 
7.90 
 
0.144 
 
16.88 
 
20.32 
 
25.00 
Note: The table presents estimated coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All 
estimations are regressed using robust standard errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 7a: 2SLS first stage regression- Alternative Zct variable 
 First stage 
regression-General 
spending 
First stage regression-
Education spending 
First stage regression-
Health spending 
First stage regression-Social 
protection spending 
Zct-1polity  
 
 
Inequality-1 
 
 
Income-1 
 
 
Investment-1 
 
 
Education-1 
 
 
Openness-1 
 
 
Population-1 
 
 
Elderly-1 
 
 
Socialist-1 
 
 
Elections-1 
 
 
Oil exporter-1 
 
 
-0.443*** 
(0.157) 
 
10.59** 
(4.32) 
 
-2.313** 
(1.10) 
 
2.178** 
(1.027) 
 
3.277*** 
(0.985) 
 
-0.407 
(1.492) 
 
7.872*** 
(0.917) 
 
3.629 
(3.584) 
 
2.204** 
(0.990) 
 
0.168 
(0.159) 
 
-0.600 
(0.399) 
-0.443*** 
(0.157) 
 
10.59** 
(4.32) 
 
-2.313** 
(1.10) 
 
2.178** 
(1.027) 
 
3.277*** 
(0.985) 
 
-0.407 
(1.492) 
 
7.872*** 
(0.917) 
 
3.629 
(3.584) 
 
2.204** 
(0.990) 
 
0.168 
(0.159) 
 
-0.600 
(0.399) 
-0.443*** 
(0.157) 
 
10.59** 
(4.32) 
 
-2.313** 
(1.10) 
 
2.178** 
(1.027) 
 
3.277*** 
(0.985) 
 
-0.407 
(1.492) 
 
7.872*** 
(0.917) 
 
3.629 
(3.584) 
 
2.204** 
(0.990) 
 
0.168 
(0.159) 
 
-0.600 
(0.399) 
-0.383*** 
(0.166) 
 
8.709** 
(4.371) 
 
-2.377** 
(1.092) 
 
1.630 
(1.051) 
 
2.949*** 
(0.976) 
 
-0.596 
(1.527) 
 
7.386*** 
(0.921) 
 
2.490 
(3.576) 
 
2.103** 
(0.971) 
 
0.149 
(0.159) 
 
-0.699* 
(0.398) 
 
N 
 
F-Test 
 
712 
 
7.96 
 
 
 
 
712 
 
7.96 
 
 
 
 
 
712 
 
7.96 
 
 
 
 
685 
 
5.30 
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Table 7b: 2SLS second stage regression- Alternative Zct variable 
 2SLS-General 
spending 
2SLS-Education 
spending 
2SLS-Health 
spending 
2SLS-Social protection 
spending 
Democracy-1polity 
 
 
Inequality-1 
 
 
Income-1 
 
 
Investment-1 
 
 
Education-1 
 
 
Openness-1 
 
 
Population-1 
 
 
Elderly-1 
 
 
Socialist-1 
 
 
Elections-1 
 
 
Oil exporter-1 
 
-0.054* 
(0.029) 
 
0.348 
(0.441) 
 
-0.118 
(0.126) 
 
-0.061 
(0.111) 
 
-0.039 
(0.126) 
 
0.029 
(0.127) 
 
0.385 
(0.242) 
 
0.377 
(0.292) 
 
0.087 
(0.104) 
 
0.022 
(0.014) 
 
-0.057 
(0.040) 
-0.091** 
(0.039) 
 
0.871 
(0.583) 
 
-0.078 
(0.166) 
 
0.104** 
(0.146) 
 
0.323* 
(0.167) 
 
0.017 
(0.168) 
 
0.819** 
(0.320) 
 
-0.291 
(0.386) 
 
0.227* 
(0.137) 
 
0.014 
(0.019) 
 
-0.092 
(0.052) 
-0.021 
(0.026) 
 
-0.488 
(0.389) 
 
-0.021 
(0.111) 
 
-0.001 
(0.098) 
 
0.075 
(0.112) 
 
0.017 
(0.112) 
 
0.336 
(0.214) 
 
0.786*** 
(0.258) 
 
0.160* 
(0.092) 
 
0.011 
(0.012) 
 
-0.026 
(0.035) 
0.018 
(0.037) 
 
-0.452 
(0.465) 
 
0.074 
(0.143) 
 
-0.336*** 
(0.115) 
 
-0.058 
(0.140) 
 
0.328** 
(0.136) 
 
-0.013 
(0.288) 
 
0.885*** 
(0.299) 
 
0.157 
(0.113) 
 
0.006 
(0.015) 
 
0.059 
(0.046) 
 
N 
 
F-test 
 
R-squared 
 
Endogeneity test 
 
Cragg-Donald test 
 
Wooldridge test 
712 
 
1.63 
 
0.152 
 
10.97 
 
7.96 
 
75.69 
712 
 
1.01 
 
0.200 
 
18.31 
 
7.96 
 
69.87 
712 
 
4.81 
 
0.134 
 
0.40 
 
7.96 
 
80.82 
685 
 
6.95 
 
0.154 
 
1.43 
 
5.29 
 
25.08 
Note: The table presents estimated coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All 
estimations are regressed using robust standard errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 8a: First stage regression-Excluding African countries 
 First stage 
regression-General 
spending 
First stage regression-
Education spending 
First stage regression-
Health spending 
First stage regression-Social 
protection spending 
Zct-1 
 
 
Inequality-1 
 
 
Income-1 
 
 
Investment-1 
 
 
Education-1 
 
 
Openness-1 
 
 
Population-1 
 
 
Elderly-1 
 
 
Socialist-1 
 
 
Elections-1 
 
 
Oil exporter-1 
 
 
0.372** 
(0.165) 
 
0.718** 
(0.393) 
 
-0.529*** 
(0.140) 
 
0.321*** 
(0.100) 
 
0.207** 
(0.093) 
 
0.283** 
(0.137) 
 
0.352** 
(0.167) 
 
-0.022 
(0.321) 
 
-0.136 
(0.301) 
 
0.004 
(0.013) 
 
-0.072** 
(0.033) 
0.372** 
(0.165) 
 
0.718** 
(0.393) 
 
-0.529*** 
(0.140) 
 
0.321*** 
(0.100) 
 
0.207** 
(0.093) 
 
0.283** 
(0.137) 
 
0.352** 
(0.167) 
 
-0.022 
(0.321) 
 
-0.136 
(0.301) 
 
0.004 
(0.013) 
 
-0.072** 
(0.033) 
0.372** 
(0.165) 
 
0.718** 
(0.393) 
 
-0.529*** 
(0.140) 
 
0.321*** 
(0.100) 
 
0.207** 
(0.093) 
 
0.283** 
(0.137) 
 
0.352** 
(0.167) 
 
-0.022 
(0.321) 
 
-0.136 
(0.301) 
 
0.004 
(0.013) 
 
-0.072** 
(0.033) 
0.384** 
(0.177) 
 
0.541 
(0.385) 
 
-0.526** 
(0.133) 
 
0.306*** 
(0.100) 
 
0.179** 
(0.089) 
 
0.377*** 
(0.138) 
 
0.318* 
(0.164) 
 
-0.059 
(0.310) 
 
-0.221 
(0.289) 
 
-0.001 
(0.013) 
 
-0.071** 
(0.032) 
 
N 
 
F-Test 
 
631 
 
5.08 
 
 
 
 
631 
 
5.08 
 
 
 
 
631 
 
5.08 
 
 
 
 
604 
 
8.66 
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Table 8b: Second stage regression-Excluding African countries 
 2SLS-General 
spending 
2SLS-Education 
spending 
2SLS-Health 
spending 
2SLS-Social protection 
spending 
Democracy-1 
 
 
Inequality-1 
 
 
Income-1 
 
 
Investment-1 
 
 
Education-1 
 
 
Openness-1 
 
 
Population-1 
 
 
Elderly-1 
 
 
Socialist-1 
 
 
Elections-1 
 
 
Oil exporter-1 
 
1.047** 
(0.522) 
 
-0.933 
(0.651) 
 
0.598* 
(0.331) 
 
-0.511** 
(0.208) 
 
-0.417*** 
(0.146) 
 
-0.172 
(0.218) 
 
-0.344 
(0.299) 
 
0.267 
(0.376) 
 
0.222 
(0.355) 
 
0.008 
(0.016) 
 
0.040 
(0.052) 
1.463** 
(0.722) 
 
-1.214 
(0.900) 
 
1.471*** 
(0.458) 
 
-0.793*** 
(0.288) 
 
-0.392* 
(0.202) 
 
-0.425 
(0.302) 
 
-0.572 
(0.413) 
 
-0.861* 
(0.520) 
 
0.845* 
(0.492) 
 
-0.006 
(0.022) 
 
0.090 
(0.072) 
0.041 
(0.375) 
 
-0.698 
(0.467) 
 
0.529** 
(0.238) 
 
-0.238 
(0.150) 
 
-0.073 
(0.105) 
 
-0.077 
(0.156) 
 
-0.012 
(0.214) 
 
0.260 
(0.270) 
 
0.565** 
(0.255) 
 
0.008 
(0.011) 
 
0.017 
(0.037) 
0.570 
(0.555) 
 
-0.305 
(0.588) 
 
0.639** 
(0.363) 
 
-0.539*** 
(0.204) 
 
-0.178 
(0.135) 
 
0.097 
(0.257) 
 
-0.306 
(0.287) 
 
0.182 
(0.364) 
 
0.223 
(0.361) 
 
0.002 
(0.016) 
 
0.118 
(0.051) 
 
N 
 
F-test 
 
R-squared 
 
Endogeneity test 
 
Cragg-Donald test 
 
Wooldridge test 
631 
 
1.29 
 
0.175 
 
9.63 
 
5.08 
 
74.89 
631 
 
1.26 
 
0.242 
 
20.69 
 
5.08 
 
49.92 
631 
 
5.77 
 
0.126 
 
0.44 
 
5.08 
 
74.31 
604 
 
3.42 
 
0.168 
 
3.83 
 
8.66 
 
55.08 
Note: The table presents estimated coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All 
estimations are regressed using robust standard errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 9a: First stage regression- Non OECD countries 
 First stage 
regression-General 
spending 
First stage regression-
Education spending 
First stage regression-
Health spending 
First stage regression-Social 
protection spending 
Zct-1 
 
 
Inequality-1 
 
 
Income-1 
 
 
Investment-1 
 
 
Education-1 
 
 
Openness-1 
 
 
Population-1 
 
 
Elderly-1 
 
 
Socialist-1 
 
 
Elections-1 
 
 
Oil exporter-1 
 
 
0.657*** 
(0.178) 
 
1.797** 
(0.851) 
 
-0.657*** 
(0.205) 
 
0.335** 
(0.163) 
 
0.077 
(0.197) 
 
0.307 
(0.254) 
 
0.154 
(0.162) 
 
0.227 
(0.507) 
 
0.036 
(0.132) 
 
0.018 
(0.036) 
 
-0.149** 
(0.075) 
0.657*** 
(0.178) 
 
1.797** 
(0.851) 
 
-0.657*** 
(0.205) 
 
0.335** 
(0.163) 
 
0.077 
(0.197) 
 
0.307 
(0.254) 
 
0.154 
(0.162) 
 
0.227 
(0.507) 
 
0.036 
(0.132) 
 
0.018 
(0.036) 
 
-0.149** 
(0.075) 
0.657*** 
(0.178) 
 
1.797** 
(0.851) 
 
-0.657*** 
(0.205) 
 
0.335** 
(0.163) 
 
0.077 
(0.197) 
 
0.307 
(0.254) 
 
0.154 
(0.162) 
 
0.227 
(0.507) 
 
0.036 
(0.132) 
 
0.018 
(0.036) 
 
-0.149** 
(0.075) 
0.655*** 
(0.202) 
 
2.246** 
(0.923) 
 
-0.617*** 
(0.231) 
 
0.396** 
(0.175) 
 
0.061 
(0.198) 
 
0.470* 
(0.285) 
 
0.409* 
(0.227) 
 
0.046 
(0.737) 
 
-0.079 
(0.147) 
 
0.004 
(0.037) 
 
-0.152** 
(0.078) 
N 
 
F-Test 
 
293 
 
13.51 
 
 
 
 
293 
 
13.51 
 
 
 
 
293 
 
13.51 
 
 
 
264 
 
10.45 
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Table 9b: Second stage regression-Non OECD countries 
 2SLS-General 
spending 
2SLS-Education 
spending 
2SLS-Health 
spending 
2SLS-Social protection 
spending 
Democracy-1 
 
 
Inequality-1 
 
 
Income-1 
 
 
Investment-1 
 
 
Education-1 
 
 
Openness-1 
 
 
Population-1 
 
 
Elderly-1 
 
 
Socialist-1 
 
 
Elections-1 
 
 
Oil exporter-1 
 
-0.092 
(0.154) 
 
-0.222 
(0.579) 
 
0.015 
(0.145) 
 
-0.196** 
(0.100) 
 
-0.014 
(0.115) 
 
0.345** 
(0.157) 
 
-0.022 
(0.095) 
 
-0.438 
(0.287) 
 
-0.001 
(0.076) 
 
0.025 
(0.020) 
 
-0.042 
(0.046) 
0.154 
(0.145) 
 
-0.471 
(0.546) 
 
0.453*** 
(0.137) 
 
-0.061 
(0.094) 
 
-0.051 
(0.108) 
 
0.052 
(0.148) 
 
0.305*** 
(0.089) 
 
-0.270 
(0.271) 
 
0.008 
(0.072) 
 
-0.008 
(0.019) 
 
-0.056 
(0.044) 
-0.018 
(0.178) 
 
-0.971 
(0.668) 
 
0.220 
(0.168) 
 
-0.045 
(0.115) 
 
-0.064 
(0.132) 
 
-0.049 
(0.181) 
 
0.195* 
(0.109) 
 
0.139 
(0.331) 
 
0.062 
(0.088) 
 
0.021 
(0.024) 
 
0.006 
(0.053) 
-0.115 
(0.249) 
 
-0.551 
(0.983) 
 
0.165 
(0.220) 
 
-0.201 
(0.160) 
 
0.073 
(0.163) 
 
0.685** 
(0.270) 
 
0.130 
(0.222) 
 
-0.734 
(0.593) 
 
0.185 
(0.120) 
 
0.015 
(0.030) 
 
0.138** 
(0.068) 
 
N 
 
F-test 
 
R-squared 
 
Endogeneity test 
 
Cragg-Donald test 
 
Wooldridge test 
293 
 
1.44 
 
0.140 
 
1.27 
 
13.51 
 
66.16 
293 
 
2.89 
 
0.132 
 
1.20 
 
13.51 
 
93.90 
293 
 
1.03 
 
0.162 
 
0.49 
 
13.51 
 
48.07 
264 
 
2.46 
 
0.195 
 
0.10 
 
10.45 
 
23.19 
Note: The table presents estimated coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. All 
estimations are regressed using robust standard errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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